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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
         Criminal liability of corporations has become one of the most debated topics of the 20th 
century.  The debate became especially significant following the 1990s, when both the United 
States and Europe have faced an alarming number of environmental, antitrust, fraud, food and 
drug, false statements, worker death, bribery, obstruction of justice, and financial crimes 
involving corporations. The most recent and prominent case in the United Sates has been the 
Enron scandal in which one of the largest accounting firms in the world, Arthur Andersen LLP, 
was charged with obstruction of justice.1 Some corporations, including Dynergy, Adelphia 
Communications, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Health South, Parmalat (in Italy), and Royal 
Ahold (in Netherlands) falsified their financial disclosures.  Other corporations, among which are 
Royal Caribbean, Olympic Pipeline, Exxon, Pfizer, Bayer, and Shering-Plough Corporation,2 
breached the environmental or health and safety laws. McWane Inc., one of the world largest 
manufacturers of cast-iron pipes, has an extensive record of violations causing deaths.3 These 
corporate crimes resulted in great losses. The consequences that most directly affect our society 
are the enormous losses of money, jobs, and even lives. At the same time, the long-term effects 
of these crimes, such as the damaging effects upon the environment or health, which may not 
severely affect us now, should not be underestimated.  
         The reaction to this corporate criminal phenomenon has been the creation of juridical 
regimes that could deter and punish corporate wrongdoing. Corporate misconduct has been 
addressed by civil, administrative, and criminal laws. At the present, most countries agree that 
corporations can be sanctioned under civil and administrative laws. However, the criminal 
liability of corporations has been more controversial. While several jurisdictions have accepted 
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and applied the concept of corporate criminal liability under various models, other law systems 
have not been able or willing to incorporate it. Critics have voiced strong arguments against its 
efficiency and consistency with the principles of criminal law. At the same time, a large pool of 
partisans, to which I belong as well, has vigorously defended corporate criminal liability.  
         In the following sections, I will attempt to determine the purposes of corporate criminal 
liability, the reasons why some jurisdictions adopted this concept, but others still refuse to accept 
it, the models of corporate criminal liability developed so far, the reasons why corporate criminal 
liability developed differently in different countries, and the lessons we could learn from these 
developments. Different countries have adopted various models of criminal liability or refused to 
adopt any due to their peculiar historical, social, economical, and political developments. Based 
on these developments, each country found it appropriate to respond to the criminal behavior of 
corporations in different ways. None of the systems is perfect; each one has advantages and 
disadvantages. Although the American system seems to be the best reply to the criminal 
corporate phenomenon, other models of corporate criminal liability have some elements that 
should be considered for the purpose of creating a better model.  
         The main goals of criminal liability of corporations are similar those of criminal law in 
general. The first characteristic of corporate criminal punishment is deterrence—effective 
prevention of future crimes. The second consists in retribution and reflects the society’s duty to 
punish those who inflict harm in order to “affirm the victim’s real value.”4 The third goal is the 
rehabilitation of corporate criminals. Fourth, corporate criminal liability should achieve the goals 
of clarity, predictability, and consistency with the criminal law principles in general. The fifth 
goal is efficiency, reflected by the first three goals mentioned above, but also by the costs of 
implementing the concept. Finally, we should not forget the goal of general fairness. The models 
 4
of corporate liability developed by different countries vary significantly and, as shown below, 
none of them reflect all these goals perfectly.  
         Although corporate criminal liability initially started by imitating the criminal liability of 
human beings, new models of criminal liability, such as the aggregation or self-identity theories, 
have been developed to better fit the corporate structure and operation. The American system of 
corporate criminal liability has been the most developed and extensive system of corporate 
criminal liability created so far. The American model includes a large variety of criminal 
sanctions for corporations (such as fines, corporate probation, order of negative publicity, etc.) in 
attempt to effectively punish corporations when any employee commits a crime while acting 
within the scope of his or her employment and on behalf of the corporation. The most 
distinguishing and bold element of the American model of corporate criminal liability is the 
adoption of the aggregation theory. This theory provides that corporations can be held criminally 
liable based on the act of one employee and on the culpability of one or more other employees 
who, cumulatively, but not individually, met the requirements of actus reus and mens rea of the 
crime. Although this system meets the goals of retribution, rehabilitation, predictability, and 
clarity, it apparently has the tendency of being a bit over-deterring and costly.5 It also has some 
significant spill-over effects on innocent shareholders and employees, and, some argue that, due 
to the adoption of the aggregation theory in particular, it lacks consistency with the traditional 
principles of criminal law.  
         The English and French models proved to be more restrictive mainly due to their 
requirement that the individuals acting on behalf of the corporation hold a high position or play a 
key function within the corporation’s decisional structure. Moreover, these systems refused to 
adopt the aggregation theory.  Due to the contemporaneous tendency of corporations to fragment 
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and delegate the power to decide and act, the prosecution of a significant number of crimes is 
prevented. Thus, although the requirements of clarity and consistency with the traditional 
principles of criminal law are met for the most part, these models seem to be under-deterring, 
less retributive,6 and, overall, less efficient. Moreover, due to the lack of the sanction of criminal 
probation the way it is instituted in U.S. and, in England, due to the lack of various other forms 
of sanctioning, the rehabilitative requirement is not adequately satisfied.  
         In Germany, the criminal liability of corporations is non-existent. Instead, Germany 
implemented a comprehensive administrative-penal system that regulates corporate criminal 
wrongdoing. The German legislators believe that the administrative liability of corporations 
fulfills the goals of deterrence, predictability, clarity, and general fairness, and is also less costly 
to implement than corporate criminal liability. Moreover, by refusing to adopt the concept of 
corporate criminal liability, the German law system pays tribute to the traditional concepts of the 
criminal law. Thus, Germans argue that the administrative-penal system is sufficient. However, 
many critics have emphasized the close similarity between the German administrative-penal law 
and the criminal law, and suggested that this system might be just a façade for criminal 
sanctioning without the protections offered by the criminal procedure. The German system 
underemphasizes the role of the moral stigma that accompanies any criminal sanction; therefore, 
it is not characterized by the retribution of the criminal punishment. In addition, the lack of 
corporate criminal liability might create the undesirable effect of attracting corporations whose 
acts are not tolerated by the criminal law of other countries; this, in turn, would increase the level 
of corporate crime.  
         The Continent European countries have based their legal systems on long history and 
traditions that have permanently marked the development of their laws. In civil law countries, the 
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doctrinal issues heavily influenced the laws and judicial decisions. And the tradition has been 
that corporations cannot commit crimes. Germany still refuses to accept the criminal liability of 
corporations and remains loyal to the old maxim societas delinquere non potest. Some of the 
reasons for this refusal have been the alleged corporations’ lack of capacity to act, lack of 
culpability, and inappropriateness of criminal sanctions.7 The most important reason has been the 
belief that the moral stigma of criminal sanctions is not necessary to fulfill the scopes of the 
punishment. At the same time, German corporations have been extremely well regulated by the 
very advanced German system of administrative law. Thus, Germany has not yet considered it 
necessary to override the old doctrinal restraints on corporate criminal liability.  
         France has abandoned the old maxim societas delinquere non potest and adopted a 
comprehensive, yet restrictive, system that addresses corporate criminal liability. This change 
was a much needed response to the increasing corporate crime phenomenon, especially when 
France lacked the very well developed and established system of administrative law previously 
developed by Germany. The French system is more restrictive compared to the American one 
because it is relatively new and the legislators have been probably cautious when implementing 
new concepts. Moreover, the adoption of corporate criminal liability has encountered a strong 
opposition from the French corporations.  
         Unlike, civil law systems, the common law legal systems have not struggled with doctrinal 
issues at the same level of intensity. The Anglo-American legal system has adopted the concept 
of corporate criminal liability as soon as it became necessary (due to the increasing corporate 
crime and lack of adequate civil or administrative sanctions) without thinking and re-thinking the 
old doctrinal traditions and arguments the way Germany or France did. The English and 
American law systems incorporated corporate criminal liability models easily. Although the 
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English model is still much more restrictive than the American one, several authors predict that 
the English model will soon undergo substantial changes towards a model similar to the 
American one. Some of the reasons that prevented the adoption of an extensive criminal 
corporate liability model in England have been the possible negative effects on innocent 
individuals and the high costs that corporations would have to pay for a monitoring system that 
would effectively prevent crimes.  
         The development of the concept of corporate criminal liability in different countries reveals 
its important functions in our society. However, because corporate criminal liability is only at its 
inception, this area of law is open to continuous improvement. Only time and practice will tell 
what the best way of achieving the goals of corporate criminal liability are. In the following 
sections I will emphasize the historical, social, and political contexts that influenced the 
development of the corporate criminal liability, the essential differences among different models 
of corporate criminal liability, and the possible desirable changes in the existing models.  
 
 
2. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
 
         Corporate criminal liability has its origins in ancient law, and became the center of the 
doctrinal discussions at the end of the 19th century. The history, laws, economics, and politics 
unique to each country have had a remarkable influence on the adoption and development of the 
concept of corporate criminal liability. This influence resulted in different models of corporate 
criminal liability. The concept of criminal liability of corporations has had a different evolution 
under civil law systems as compared to its development under common law systems. At the same 
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time, under the civil law or common law systems, corporate criminal liability has developed 
differently to reflect the historical and socio-economic realities of different countries. The 
historical evolution of corporate criminal liability shows that corporate criminal liability is 
consistent with the principles of criminal law and the nature of corporations. Furthermore, the 
historical development of corporate criminal liability reveals that criminal liability of 
corporations is part of an important “public policy bargain. The bargain balances privileges 
granted upon the legal recognition of a corporation—such as limited liability of corporate 
shareholders and the capability of a group of investors to act through a single corporate form—
with law compliance and crime prevention pressures on the managers of the resulting corporate 
entity.”8 
         Aside from the existence of the Roman state and its territorial units called civitas or 
coloniae, the right of individuals to constitute trade, religious, and charitable associations has 
been recognized early in the development of the Roman law.  The Roman entities were called 
universitates personarum (or corpus/ universitas, which included the Roman state and other 
entities with religious, administrative, financial, or economic scopes) and univesritates rerum 
(which included entities with charitable scopes). Upon creation by authorization, the entities had 
their own identity, owned property separate from that of their founders, and had independent 
rights and obligations. Although these entities were viewed as a fiction of the law, and despite 
the fact that the Roman doctrine considered that these associations lacked independent will, in 
some authors’ view, an entity could commit a crime and criminal causes of actions against them 
existed.9 The acknowledgement of the existence of independent entities with rights and 
obligations constituted the basis for the evolution of corporate institutions in the medieval.   
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         The Germanic law has also promoted the development of associations. The land was shared 
among families, and not among individuals. However, unlike the Roman universitas, which were 
fictitious creations of the law, the Germanic law considered that both the corporations and the 
individuals were real subjects of law. In 595, Coltaire II created the centuries and curies 
(territorial units); these territorial entities were liable for the crimes committed on their 
territory.10 The rationale of the collective responsibility in the Germanic law relied on the 
function of the sanction; sanctions were imposed not based on the concept of guilt, but on the 
outcome of the action. Therefore, if damages resulted from an individual action, a sanction was 
imposed to repair the damages. The sanction was viewed more as compensation than 
punishment, and because the property was owned by the collectivity, it was only logical that the 
collectivity should pay the damages.  
         Later, in the 12th-14th centuries, the concept of corporate criminal liability evolved; the 
Romanic law clearly imposed criminal liability on the universitas, but only when its members 
were acting collectively.11 At the same time, Pope Innocent IV created the basis for the maxim 
societas delinquere non potest by claiming that, unlike individuals who have willpower and a 
soul, can receive the communion, and are the subjects of God’s and emperor’s punishments, 
universitas are fictions that lack a body and a soul, and therefore, cannot be punished. However 
the majority of the doctrine rejected this argument because of the realties of that time, and 
admitted the existence of juristic persons and their capacity of being sanctioned for their crimes 
if certain conditions were met. The emperors and popes used to frequently sanction the villages, 
provinces, and corporations.12 The sanctions imposed could be fines, the loss of specific rights, 
dissolution, and spiritual sanctions upon the members of the corporations, such as the loss of the 
right to be buried, or excommunication.13  
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         In the 14th century, the doctrine recognized that corporations had their own willpower and 
therefore, their criminal liability was a given. With a few exceptions (such as bigamy, rape, etc.), 
an entity could commit any crime which could be committed by an individual, regardless of the 
fact that the crime had no connection with the scope of the corporation.14 This theory dominated 
the continental European doctrine until the end of the 18th Century. The medieval conception was 
based on the belief that all the corporations should be liable, both civilly and criminally, for the 
acts committed by their members.  Cities, villages, universities, trade, and religious associations 
have been required to pay fines for their crimes. At the same time, the Germanic law was still 
loyal to the old concept of collective responsibility and, through a 1548 ordinance, sanctioned the 
cities that did not keep the peace by fines and loss of all liberties.15  
        In France, Ordonnance de Blois of 1579 enacted the criminal liability of corporations. The 
crime committed must have been the result of the collectivity’s decision.  Therefore, although the 
corporations were still considered legal fictions, the existence of corporate criminal liability 
sustains the conclusion that corporate criminal liability was not incompatible with the nature of 
the corporations. Before the French Revolution, the French Grande Ordonnance Criminelle of 
1670 established16 the criminal liability of corporations on similar basis. In addition, the 
ordinance provided for the simultaneous criminal liability of individuals for committing the same 
crimes as accomplices. 
         The French Revolution brought extreme changes in the French law; the corporations, 
including the provinces and nonprofit hospitals, have been completely eliminated and all their 
goods confiscated.17 The notion of corporation was incompatible with the individualist 
aspirations of the revolutionary government.18 Moreover, the new government thought that, due 
to their economic and political influence, corporations represented a potential threat for the new 
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regime.19 There was also a financial explanation for this decision; the new revolutionary 
government was in immediate need of funds. The finances were mainly owned by the 
corporations and the easiest way of getting those funds was by confiscation from the 
corporations after their elimination.20 Therefore, the French Penal Code of 1810 stopped 
mentioning the criminal liability of corporations, but not because the concept was incompatible 
with the doctrine, but because such liability was futile as a consequence of the corporations’ 
disappearance from the French system of law.21   
         Under the influence of the French Revolution ideals, the majority of the continental Europe 
changed its view regarding corporate criminal liability. Corporations lost their power and 
importance and became undesirable entities under the antagonistic coalition of the monarchic 
absolutism and liberalism. This reality determined the creation of doctrinal theories that tried to 
find a basis for the lack of criminal liability of corporations. Malblanc and Savigny are the first 
authors sustaining the principle societas delinquere non potest in the 19th century.22 The main 
argument was that a corporation is a legal fiction which, lacking a body and soul, was not 
capable of forming the criminal mens rea or to act in propria persona. Moreover, corporate 
criminal liability would violate the principle of individual criminal punishment.23 German jurists 
also adhered to the “fiction theory.” Thus, E. Bekker and A. Briz argued that corporations have a 
pure patrimonial character which is created for a particular commercial purpose and lacks 
juridical capacity. Therefore, corporations cannot be the subjects of criminal liability.24  
         Critics of the “fiction theory,” such as O. Gierke and E. Zitelman, argued that corporations 
are unities of bodies and souls and can act independently. The corporations’ willpower is the 
result of their members’ will.25 F. von Liszt and A. Maester were some of the principal authors 
who tried to substantiate the concept of corporate criminal liability in this period. They argued 
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that the corporations’ capacity to act under the criminal law is not fundamentally different from 
that under civil or administrative law; corporations are juristic persons that have willpower and 
can act independently from their members.26  
          During the time of these doctrinal disputes, the number and importance of corporations in 
the European society increased significantly. The laws became more flexible and the states’ role 
in the process of incorporation diminished.27 For the purpose of controlling the corporate 
misconduct, the Council of Europe recommended that “those member states whose criminal law 
had not yet provided for corporate criminal liability to reconsider the matter.”28 France 
responded by making several revisions of its Penal Code for the purpose of modernizing its text. 
The revision of 1992 officially recognized the corporate criminal liability because, in the opinion 
of the French legislators, it made more judicial sense29 and because it lacked other effective ways 
of sanctioning criminal corporate misconduct. This process culminated with the Nouveau Code 
Penale in 1994.30 The French New Penal Code established, for the first time in any civil law 
system, a comprehensive set of corporate criminal liability principles and sanctions31 providing 
in article 121-2 that, with the exception of the State, all the juristic persons are criminally liable 
for the offenses committed on their behalf by their organs or representatives.32 The establishment 
of the corporate criminal liability attracted the critiques of thousands of corporations that could 
not believe in “such a revolution.”33 Ever since, France has had a relatively wide practice in this 
field.34  
         France’s example was followed by numerous other European countries. Thus, Belgium, 
through the Law of May 4, 1999, modified art. 5 of the Belgian Penal Code and instituted the 
criminal liability of juristic persons.35 Netherlands adopted the concept of corporate criminal 
liability even earlier, in 1976. Art. 51 of the Dutch Penal Code provides that natural persons as 
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well as juristic persons can commit offenses. In 2002 Denmark modified its Penal Code and 
established that corporations may be liable for all offenses within the general criminal code.36    
         Germany on the other hand, due to doctrinal issues, still resists the idea of incorporating 
corporate criminal liability in its legal system.37 In Germany, corporate criminal liability is still 
governed by the maxim societas delinquere non potest and corporate misconduct is the subject of 
a very developed system of administrative38 and administrative-penal law.39 Germany’s 
administrative-penal system, called Ordnungswidrigkeiten (OwiG),40 is the successor of 
Ubertretungen, a category of petty offences. The reason for “this growth of administrative 
procedures is of course to be found in the evolution of the Etat-Gendarme to the twentieth-
century welfare State, resulting in an enormous expansion of the domain of the State…”41 
         The administrative fines, called Geldbussen, are imposed by specialized administrative 
bodies which are part of the executive branch of the government. The sanctions can be imposed 
both to individuals and corporations. Under the administrative-penal law, punitive sanctions can 
be applied.42 However, the imposition of administrative sanctions does not imply moral stigma 
“and this consideration seems to have been the most important for the German legislature in 
opting for administrative sanctions rather than leaving the matter under the aegis of the criminal 
law.”43 The main arguments in defense of the lack of corporate criminal liability in Germany are: 
corporations do not have the capacity to act, corporations cannot be culpable, and the criminal 
sanctions are appropriate, by their nature, only for human beings.44  
         Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain followed the German model and refuse to hold 
corporations criminally liable.45 For example, Italy imposed a system of administrative liability 
of corporations through the Decree-Law No. 300 of September 29, 2000 and the Decree-Law 
No. 231 of May 8, 2001.46 However, the Italian doctrine argues that this administrative liability 
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is, in reality, criminal in nature because it is connected to the commission of a crime and is 
applied by using rules of criminal procedure.47   
         Due to historical circumstances, the evolution of common law systems has been different 
and did not embrace the Roman concepts. Unlike the civil law, which has its sources in 
legislative acts, the sources of the common law are the judicial decisions and the legislative acts. 
The adoption of the concept of corporate criminal liability has followed a conservative course 
under the English law.48 Initially, England refused to accept the idea of corporate criminal 
liability for several reasons. Corporations were considered legal fictions, artificial entities that 
could do no more than what “legally empowered to do (ultra vires theory).”49 Because 
corporations lacked souls, they could not have mens rea and could neither be blameworthy, nor 
punished.50 Chief Justice Holt decided that corporations could not be criminally liable, but their 
members could.51 In addition, corporations were very few in number, incorporation being a 
privilege granted by the crown. Therefore, the influence of corporations on the society was 
minimal.52    
         During the 16th and 17th centuries, corporations became more common and their 
importance in the socio-economic life increased. A need for controlling corporate misconduct 
became more and more obvious. Corporations have been recognized as independent entities 
which owned property distinct from that of their members.53 The first step in the English 
development of corporate criminal liability was made in the 1840s when the courts imposed 
liability on corporations for strict liability offenses.54 Lord Bowen decided that the most efficient 
way of coercing corporations was by introducing the concept of corporate criminal liability in the 
English law.55 Soon after, by borrowing the theory of vicarious liability from the tort law,56 the 
courts imposed vicarious criminal liability on corporations in those cases when natural persons 
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could be vicariously liable as well.57 In 1944, the High Court of Justice decided in three 
landmark cases58 to impose direct criminal liability on corporations and established that the mens 
rea of certain employees was to be considered as that of the company itself. The motivation of 
the decisions was vague and confusing due to the lack of clear and organized criteria for 
attributing the mens rea element to corporations.59 This issue was clarified in 1972 in a case60 in 
which the civil law alter ego doctrine was used to impose the criminal liability on corporations; 
this is now known under the name of “identification theory.”61 The Chamber of Lords compared 
the corporation to a human body, different individuals representing different organs and 
functions of the juristic person (e.g. the directors and managers represent the brain, intelligence, 
and will of the corporation). The willpower of the corporations’ managers represented the 
willpower of the corporations. This theory was later criticized and slightly modified, but this 
decision still represents the landmark precedent in the English corporate criminal liability.  
         The United States initially followed the English example, but later developed differently 
and more rapidly due to the important role of corporations in the American economy and society. 
The foundation of most forms of political organization in the American colonies was the 
corporate charter which perpetuated the corporate form of governance.62 Unlike the English 
courts, the American courts were much faster in holding corporations criminally liable.63 
Initially, the American courts promoted similar arguments against corporate criminal liability.64 
The courts started by imposing criminal corporate liability in cases of regulatory or public 
welfare offenses not requiring proof of mens rea65—nuisance, malfeasance, non-feaseance and 
vicarious liability cases.66  
         At the beginning of the 20th century, the corporate criminal liability concept was widely 
accepted in the American society and was expanded to mens rea offenses.67 The Court held in 
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New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v.  U.S.68 that the defendant corporation can be 
responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of its agents, acting within the 
authority conferred upon them. The Court held that the law “cannot shut its eyes to the fact that 
the great majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted through these bodies, 
and particularly that interstate commerce is almost entirely in their hands, and [giving] them 
immunity from all punishment because of the old doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a 
crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and 
correcting the abuses aimed at.”69At the present, corporate criminal liability is virtually as broad 
as individual criminal liability, corporations being prosecuted even for manslaughter.70           
 
3. ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
         Criminal liability of corporations has been the subject of vigorous debates for the last 
century. International congresses, studies, articles, and notes have addressed this issue and have 
been the ground for doctrinal confrontations among the partisans and adversaries of this concept. 
Every element of corporate criminal liability has been discussed, attacked, or defended. Most of 
the arguments were built on the principle societas delinquere non potest and on the belief that 
alternative forms of liability (like civil or administrative liability of corporations or criminal 
liability of individuals acting for the corporation) are superior to corporate criminal liability. In 
the following subsections I will show how different countries have responded to these 
arguments, and the basic elements of corporate criminal liability which vary from country to 
country. First, it must be determined what entities can be held criminally liable. Second, you will 
find out for what crimes corporations can be held criminally liable. Third, you will learn what 
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individuals, by what kind of act, and with what state of mind, can induce the criminal liability of 
corporations. Finally, I will make a concise presentation of the criminal sanctions available for 
corporate crimes and the alternatives to corporate criminal liability.   
 
a.          What Entities? 
 
         The first step in determining the applicability of corporate criminal liability is delineating 
the types of entities that it applies to. There is no unitary view regarding this aspect. Initially, 
some argued that corporations cannot be held criminally liable because, unlike human beings 
who are true subjects of law, corporations are legal fictions. This argument was rapidly 
abandoned due to the fact that the existence of the corporations is an incontestable realty in the 
social, economic, and juridical life of our society. Nowadays, corporations have legal capacity in 
the majority of areas of law, own real property and goods distinct from those of their members, 
and have their own rights and obligations.  
         Similar to individuals, corporations have an identifiable persona and the capacity to express 
moral judgments.71  Corporations have an identifiable persona in the sense that they have a 
unique presence in the community, different from that of their owners or managers; they have 
“ethos” that makes them unique and different from the individuals controlling or working for the 
corporations.72 The ethos can be derived from the corporation’s dynamic, structure, monitoring 
system, aims, policies, promotion of compliance with the laws, and discipline of the 
employees.73 The United States Supreme Court has decided that corporations have the capacity 
to express independent points of view and moral judgments, and their freedom of speech should 
not be abridged without a compelling state interest.74  
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         Moreover, corporations are recognized as passive legal subjects in criminal law; a 
corporation has a cause of action against an individual who harmed it. It would be at least bizarre 
to accept that a corporation is a reality when it is harmed by others, but not when it violates the 
rights of other persons.75 Therefore, the “fictive character” argument cannot be successfully used 
by the adversaries of corporate criminal liability. 
         Once it has been decided that corporations can be subjects of criminal law, it has been 
subsequently debated whether all corporations should be held criminally liable. Some authors 
have argued that the creation of exceptions would produce an inequitable discrimination. This 
point of view cannot be sustained because the criminal law also has exceptions regarding the 
individuals who can be subjects of criminal liability.76 Thus, if a government employee acting in 
his or her ministerial function is immune from criminal liability, there is no reason why the 
governmental institutions would not benefit from the same exception. Some very limited and 
clearly delineated exceptions that promote higher interests should be admissible. At the same 
time, in order to avoid confusion, entities with no legal status, or entities in process of dissolution 
or merger should be held liable when the entities held liable are clearly individualized.   
         The majority has agreed that private entities are subject to criminal liability. The French 
legislators have raised the issue of freedom of association when deciding whether entities 
without a lucrative scope should be held criminally liable. They decided that the freedom of 
association cannot be manifested outside the legal limits. The non-commercial character of the 
associations cannot justify their impunity when committing a crime; the exceptions from 
criminal liability must be absolutely necessary.77 Thus, private entities with commercial and non-
commercial scopes should be held equally liable under the criminal law. Under article 121-2 of 
the French Penal Code the juristic persons are criminally liable for the crimes they committed.78 
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Therefore, associations, foundations, parties, and syndicates/ unions are criminally liable because 
they often own property that could be used for illicit purposes or they could use information 
obtained from their members for illegal purposes.79  
         The criminal liability of syndicates in England has a special treatment. In 1871, syndicates 
were not considered passive subjects of criminal law and the causes of actions against them were 
actually causes of actions against their trustees.80 In 1901, the English court decided that 
syndicates could be held criminally liable; if the law acknowledges the syndicates’ capacity to 
own property and commit defamation, then syndicates should bear the responsibility for their 
unlawful acts.81 Following the strong protests of the syndicates, the English Parliament adopted 
in 1906 a law conferring immunity from criminal liability to syndicates. At the present, the 
English syndicates are the only private entities that are not held criminally liable.82  
         Unlike England, the United States decided in 1922 that unions can be held criminally 
liable. The Supreme Court held in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.83 that trade 
unions could violate the criminal law provisions and they should not escape its application. 
Because unions manage enormous sums of money and their membership exceeds hundreds of 
thousands of people, they should be held criminally liable. Moreover, the victims of unions’ 
misconduct cannot realistically sue such a large number of members individually in order to 
recover the damages caused.  
         The majority of legislations granted the state/government an exception from criminal 
liability. Art. 121-2 of the French Penal Code provides that the juristic persons, with the 
exception of the State, are criminally liable.84 France also grants an exception to some territorial 
collectivities when exercising a governmental function which cannot make the subject of 
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delegation to private subjects of law.85 Thus, the majority of public entities have a criminal 
responsibility similar to that of private entities.  
         In common law systems, the rule was that the King can do no wrong. In England, the state, 
government, and ministries are not criminally liable for the common law crimes. However, the 
laws can provide that the Crown can be held liable for other crimes.86  In the United States, the 
Model Penal Code expressly states that the entities organized by a governmental agency for the 
purpose of implementing a governmental activity are not criminally liable. However, the courts 
have not denied the possibility that governmental institutions be held criminally liable. Even 
though there is no case of criminally sanctioning governmental institutions, the administrative 
liability of such institutions has been admitted.87  
         The issue of whether entities without a legal status can be held criminally liable has been 
also resolved differently.  Some opinions argued that criminal liability of such entities should not 
be allowed in order to maintain the coherence, consistency, and predictability of the criminal 
law. Others argue that the act of registration or incorporation should not bear so much 
importance when the entity is already an autonomous subject; the predictability of the criminal 
law can be assured if the law clearly individualizes the entities that can be assimilated to the 
juristic persons.88  
         Article 121-2 of the French Penal Code does not acknowledge that the non-legal-status 
entities can have the capacity to commit crimes.89  The Cassation Court manifested the intention 
of extending the criminal liability to non-legal status entities that benefited from such crimes.90 
The majority of the French doctrine has negatively criticized this attempt based on theoretical 
concepts. The doctrine argued that such a jurisprudential extension of the concept of juristic 
person would create insecurity.91 Moreover, due to the basic characteristics of the civil law 
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systems, courts are to strictly interpret the law and cannot create new rules throughout the stare 
decisis process. 
         In common law systems, the unregistered or unincorporated entities are criminally liable 
under the same conditions as the registered or incorporated entities. Thus, in England, under the 
Interpretation Act of 1978, the concept of juristic person includes associations92.  In U.S., the 
traditional view was that, in the absence of a law passed by Congress that provides otherwise, 
partnerships or joint ventures cannot be held criminally liable because they do not have a 
separate identity from that of their members.93 However, under the federal law, the concept of 
“person” includes the partnerships and other similar entities.94 The U.S. Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines defines and lists the organizations which are subject to regulation. “Organization” 
means a “person other than an individual.”95 ”The term includes corporations, partnerships, 
associations, joint-stock companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, 
governments and political subdivisions thereof, and nonprofit organizations.”96 
         On the other hand, corporations and partnerships going trough the process of dissolution, 
transformation, or merger are liable for the crimes committed in most of the countries.97 Thus, 
under article 133-1 of the French Penal Code, the fines can be executed before the end of the 
liquidation of the corporation.98 The American law has similar rules. Succession or merger does 
not extinguish the corporate criminal liability. When a corporation merges with another, the 
former continues to exist as part of the latter, and is responsible for its crimes.99  The courts have 
held that corporations in the process of dissolution can be held criminally liable because 
corporations continue to exist for the purpose of “paying, satisfying and discharging any existing 
debts and obligations…”100    
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         In Germany, under the non-criminal liability model, corporations and other legal status 
entities are autonomous subjects of law enjoying the same fundamental rights as the 
individuals.101 The liability of corporations, enterprises, entrepreneurs, associations, and other 
juristic persons is equally recognized under the administrative-penal system.  At the same time, 
public entities and territorial collectivities can be held liable under the administrative-penal 
law.102 
         The American system of defining the entities that can be held liable under the criminal law 
has some substantial advantages. Listing the entities that can be held criminally liable is probably 
more clear and cheaper; it prevents unnecessary waste of time and money by the courts when 
determining what entities can be held criminally liable. At the same time, the goal of general 
fairness is satisfied by including non-legal status entities. This inclusion reflects the reality that 
non-legal-status entities can commit crimes and should not escape liability due to a technicality. 
Because of the unpredictable situations that can appear due to the development of the law and the 
ingenious nature of the human beings creating such entities, the list should not be exhaustive so 
courts could add to the list new entities based on clear standards that give appropriate notice. 
This would satisfy the predictability requirement. The American model also meets the goals of 
deterrence and retribution by giving notice to all potential corporate criminals and by punishing 
most of them. The only disadvantage would be the arguable lack of consistency with the general 
principles of criminal law when punishing non-legal status entities.  
         The French and English models are more restrictive. They are less efficient because they do 
not clearly enumerate the entities that can be held criminally liable.  The requirement of general 
fairness is not met when refusing to punish non-legal-status entities that commit crimes. At the 
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same time, the goals of deterrence and retribution are not satisfied. However, these systems have 
the advantages of being clear and consistent with the general principles of criminal law.  
  
b. What Crimes? 
 
       There are three systems of determining for which crimes the corporations can be held liable. 
Under the first system—general liability103 or plenary liability104—the juristic persons’ liability 
is similar to that of individuals, corporations being virtually capable of committing any crime. 
The second system requires that the legislator mention for each crime whether corporate criminal 
liability is possible. The third system consists of listing all the crimes for which collective 
entities can be held liable.105  
         The first system has been adopted by England, Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, and 
Australia.106In England, the corporations are liable for almost any type of crimes. Although 
general liability is the rule, there are some limits based on the principle lex non cogit ad 
impossibilia.107  Thus, juristic persons are not liable for crimes punished only by 
imprisonment.108 Presently there are only two crimes punishable only by imprisonment: murder 
and treason. Under the same principle, corporations are not liable for crimes expressly excluded 
by the legislator or crimes that, due to their nature, cannot be committed by corporations. Hence, 
corporations cannot commit bigamy, incest, perjury, or rape109 even though, some authors argue 
that such crimes could be committed by corporations as instigators.110The English courts have 
held that corporations can be sued for manslaughter.111 
         The second system has been implemented in France. Thus, under article 121-2 of the 
French Penal Code, the juristic persons are criminally liable only when the law or regulation 
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expressly provides for such liability.112 Thus, when one wants to know whether a corporation is 
liable for a certain crime, he or she must look in the code/law, under the section for that specific 
crime, to see whether the legislator mentioned the possibility of engaging the criminal liability of 
corporations. This system has its rationale in the science of criminology; corporations are 
sanctioned for specific crimes based on the frequency of the corporations’ involvement in such 
crimes.113 However, this system is not comprehensive. By trying to exclude the crimes that 
cannot be committed by corporations, the French legislators inadvertently omitted some labor 
and economic crimes, and also neglected the fact that even the crimes that cannot be committed 
by corporations as authors can probably be committed by corporations as instigators or 
accomplices.114  
         The third model is reflected by the American law. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines include 
a detailed list of the offenses that can be committed by corporations.115 Corporate criminal 
liability virtually extends to all the crimes that can be committed by individuals.116 Thus, a 
corporation can be convicted for theft, forgery,117 bribery,118 and manslaughter or negligent 
homicide.119 Also, in People v. O’Neil, even though the corporation has not been found guilty, 
the court has not denied the possibility that corporations can be held criminally liable for 
murder.120 
         Under the German non-criminal model of corporate liability, the corporations are 
administratively liable for crimes or administrative-penal offenses committed by an organ or 
representative.121 Section 30 of Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (OWiG) does not impose a limit on 
the list of offenses for which corporations can be held liable. Corporations are not liable for 
offenses which by their very nature can be committed only by individuals. The only condition is 
that the offenses be linked with the corporation’s activities. However, it is not required that the 
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offense be within the competences conceded to the corporation. Thus, a corporation can be held 
liable under the administrative-penal system for homicides, offenses against the patrimony, 
etc.122   
         The American model has the advantages of avoiding confusion and long searches in 
various statutes. Thus, the American system meets the requirements of clarity, predictability, 
efficiency, and consistency with the general principles of criminal law. Unless it is certain that 
there is no other possible crime that a corporation could be held liable for, the list of crimes 
should not be exhaustive. In this respect, the English and German models are good examples 
because they do not limit the list of crimes for which corporations can be held criminally liable, 
but they provide for liability similar to that of individuals. The French system, in attempt to be 
clear and predictable, turned out to be less efficient due to the amount of time necessary to do the 
searches in various statutes and to the omission of several crimes. Moreover, similarly to the 
English system, the French system omits the possibility that some crimes that could not be 
committed by corporations as principals could probably be committed by corporations as 
accomplices or instigators.  
            
          
c. When and Which Natural Persons Can Cause Corporate Criminal Liability? 
 
         Initially, it has been argued that corporations are not capable of forming the material and 
mental elements of a crime due to their immaterial and highly regulated existence. The 
attribution of the acts and the mental state of persons acting on behalf of the corporation to the 
corporation it was said to contravene the principle of individual punishment underlying the 
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criminal law. These arguments failed in most legal systems, but the sphere of individuals and the 
conditions in which they can lead to the criminal liability of corporations differs more or less 
dramatically from country to country.  
         At first, some critics argued that corporations do not have the capacity to act on their own 
and therefore, the actus reus element of a crime cannot be attributed to them.123 The acts 
attributed to the corporations are merely those of individuals acting on behalf of the corporations. 
Thus, “[i]mposing criminal liability on a corporate entity requires resort to the principles of 
respondeat superior, rather than individual responsibility, which is the hallmark of the criminal 
law.”124 It is incontestable, that, due to the corporations’ nature, the actions or inactions cannot 
be committed directly and personally by the corporation. However, the acts of the representatives 
are those of the corporation itself because the representatives are not distinct from the 
corporation; representatives are part of the corporation, a structural element of the corporation 
essential for the corporation’s existence and without which the corporation cannot fulfill its 
purpose. Moreover, representatives are not personally liable for acts within the scope of the 
powers granted to them, but the corporation is held liable for them. Therefore, admitting the 
existence of the corporations’ ability to act does not mean liability for another’s act; it merely 
means that corporations are liable for the activity conducted by individuals on their behalf using 
the power that has been conferred upon them by the corporations’ bylaws.125 Moreover, those 
that are subjects of legal duties, not only can perform those duties, but can also breach them.126  
         Another argument was based on the ultra vires theory. Critics argue that an illicit act would 
fall outside the scope of the corporation and therefore, cannot be considered to be perpetrated by 
the corporations.127 The capacity of action of corporations and their representatives is limited by 
the laws, articles of incorporation, and bylaws; no law or bylaw gives them the power to commit 
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a criminal offense. Therefore, any crime is necessarily ultra vires. The protection of corporations 
resulting from the ultra vires theory has been eliminated first in tort law and subsequently, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, in the criminal law.128 The purpose of the articles of incorporation 
and bylaws is to assure organized services, to avoid confusion regarding the corporations’ 
activity, and to permit an efficient surveillance of their activity. It would be absurd to consider 
that the ultra vires theory, destined to insure the legality of the corporations’ activity, could 
transform into a reason to refuse to punish the corporations when acting illegally.129  Moreover, 
although the articles of incorporation provide certain scopes for the corporation, the corporation 
can do whatever else is necessary to conduct its activity. The scope of incorporation should not 
be confused with the corporations’ scopes during its activity; the scope of incorporation must 
always be legal, but the corporations’ actions after incorporation are not always in conformity 
therewith.130 Although civil offenses are not within the scope of a corporation, corporations are 
nonetheless held liable when committing such offenses. Similarly, corporations should be held 
liable for criminal offenses.  
         The core argument against corporate criminal liability has been the belief that a corporation 
cannot have mens rea and therefore, cannot be blameworthy or guilty of a criminal offense.131 
Critics showed that the corporate will and power of decision are exercised through the will of the 
collectivity of people managing the corporation. Therefore, it is said that the mens rea element of 
a criminal offense does not belong to the corporation, but to the members who made the decision 
to take a specific course of action.132 The corporation would be punished without being 
blameworthy and this would be against the criminal law principles.133 However, the majority of 
doctrine recognizes the independent existence of a corporate will134 which does not always 
identify itself with that of the collectivity of members of the corporation.135 The corporation’s 
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capacity to act and decide has been recognized in contract, administrative, and constitutional law. 
Therefore, if a corporation has the capacity to think and decide when it is a part to a contract (and 
thus being the subject of contractual rights and obligations), it cannot be sustained that corporate 
will power exists when it produces legal effects, but not when the effects created are illegal 
(criminal offenses).136 Moreover, being widely accepted that corporations have civil liability, it 
would be difficult to explain why the corporation should not be held liable when the offense 
committed is more serious (criminal offense as opposed to civil offense). The culpability of 
corporations exists and it is sufficient for the culpability required by the criminal law.137 
         After defeating these arguments, the issue became how wide the pool of individuals who 
can draw the corporate criminal liability should be, by what acts, and with what mental state. 
Although the corporations are the subjects of the law, the action or inaction of a human being is 
necessary to engage the corporations’ criminal liability. Initially, the persons who could engage 
the corporations’ liability were limited to the corporate organs. The organs represented the soul 
of the corporation, their actions were the corporation’s actions, and therefore, the crimes 
committed by the organs were those of the corporation.138  Nowadays, in some legal systems, 
there is a tendency of expanding the categories of persons who can cause corporate criminal 
liability.  
         Under Article 121-2 of the French Penal Code, corporations are criminally liable for the 
crimes committed on their behalf by their organs and representatives.139 When the organs or 
representatives have the required mens rea and actus reus of the crime, the corporation is 
automatically liable.140 The organs are individuals exercising an administrative or other 
important function conferred by law or the charter of the corporation.141 The notion of 
“representative” is wider than that of “organ,” and includes other persons such as the temporary 
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administrators, liquidators, and special agents.142 Therefore, the acts of other members or 
subordinate employees cannot engage the criminal liability of corporations even when the acts 
are committed in the benefit of the corporations. Due to this requirement, the French system is 
the most restrictive model of the jurisdictions presented here.143 However, it is not always 
necessary to identify the representative or the organ; such is the case for the crimes by omission 
or when the crime was based on a collective decision by secret vote. It is sufficient to know that 
an organ or representative acted or failed to act when he or she had a duty to, but knowing his or 
her identity is not necessary.144          
         The organs and representatives must act on behalf of the corporation.145 The notion of 
crime committed on behalf of the corporation varies based on the type of crime committed 
because the commission of a crime presupposes the existence of a subjective element—mens 
rea—and an objective element—the profit.146 Therefore, when committing theft, the objective 
element will be more accentuated, but when committing discrimination the subjective element 
would have more importance since it is difficult to point to a specific profit that the corporation 
would gain from such crime. Hence, crimes committed solely in the personal interest of the 
organ or representative would not engage the criminal liability of the corporation.147 
Nevertheless, when the individual acts partially in his benefit and partially in the benefit of the 
corporation, the corporation would be held criminally liable.148 The benefit may consist in 
obtaining a profit, avoiding a loss, or any other kind of benefit.149  
         Acting on behalf of the corporation does not always imply a benefit; such is the case when 
a director discriminates in the process of hiring or when he or she negligently fails to verify the 
safety equipment used by the corporation’s employees.150 Despite the fact that the corporation 
does not benefit from such crimes, it is still held criminally liable. Moreover, the crimes by 
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omissions are presumed to be committed on behalf of the corporation when the organ or 
representative had a duty to act.151 Even when an organ or representative acts outside the limits 
of his or her power, the corporation is held criminally liable.152    
         In France, the organ or representative of the corporation can commit both intentional and 
unintentional crimes on behalf of the corporation.153 When the mens rea and the actus reus 
elements are established with reference to the organ or representative, the corporation is 
automatically liable as long as the cause and effect relationship (but not the culpability) between 
the commission of the crime and the activity done on behalf of the organization is proved.154  
         In Germany, although corporations cannot be held criminally liable, corporations are liable 
for criminal offenses under the administrative-penal law. Both administrative and criminal courts 
can impose administrative sanctions.155 Section 30 of the OWiG—Administrative Offences Act 
limits the class of individuals whose acts can make the corporation liable to the legal 
representatives or directors of the corporation.156 The acts of the representatives or directors are 
automatically considered those of the corporation if the crime could have been prevented by the 
corporation.157 The corporation is merely responsible for the offenses, but not criminally 
culpable.158  
         The class of individuals who can engage the liability of corporations can be expanded in 
two ways; first, the courts “have not considered it necessary to name the persons who have acted 
provided it is clear that someone in the class described in section 30 of the OWiG has”159 and, 
second, because under section 130 of OWiG lack of surveillance is an administrative-penal 
offense, when employees who are not legal representatives or directors commit an offense that 
could have been prevented by an adequate surveillance by officers within the section 30 of 
OWiG, the corporation is liable.160 The lack of surveillance may be due to a defective 
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organization of the corporation. There must be a showing that the offense could have been 
prevented with reasonable efforts:161 only then it is justifiable to punish the corporation.162  
Section 30 of OWiG also provides procedural rules which do not make it necessary to pursue or 
identify the individual author of the offense.163 Moreover, the offense must be connected with the 
corporate activities.164 The organ or representative must either have violated his or her legal 
duties, or the conduct must have resulted or been intended to result in patrimonial benefit to the 
corporation.165 Under the German law, strict liability offenses do not exist because culpability is 
the core requirement for liability.166  
         In common law systems, corporate criminal liability is based on two main theories: the 
identification theory and the respondeat superior theory. The identification theory (also called 
the alter ego theory) was developed by the English law by importing the concept from the civil 
law of tort.167 Under this anthropomorphic theory, a sufficiently high ranking corporate member 
acts not as an agent of the corporation, but as the corporation itself.168  In Tesco Supermarkets 
Ltd. v. Nattrass,169 the court compared corporations to human bodies; the high ranking managers 
represent the nervous systems that control what the corporations do. Therefore, the mens rea and 
actus reus of the high ranking managers are automatically those of the corporation and no other 
method of proof is necessary.170 Whether an officer controls the corporation as the brains control 
the human body is a question of law; the determining factor of this test is whether the officer 
could act independently.171  
         The identification theory has been largely criticized. This theory can function properly only 
for small corporations where only the high-ranking managers are involved in the decision 
process.172 Today’s corporations are very complex and many other persons are involved in the 
decision making process. Corporate agents other than the top managers do not engage the 
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criminal liability of corporations. Moreover, corporations can evade liability by structuring 
themselves in a way that few decisions could be taken by controlling officers.173 The 
identification of the person is also necessary and this creates a serious bar to prosecution of a 
highly complex corporation characterized by diffusion of responsibility. Therefore, crimes that 
rely on defective organization are not included.174 Another disadvantage is that it is impossible to 
cumulate the acts or mens rea of multiple controlling officers.175  
         In the English law, the essential conditions of corporate criminal liability vary based on the 
nature of the crime. For strict liability crimes, corporations are liable if the crime resulted in a 
benefit to the corporations. The jurisprudence considers that if the law imposes an obligation, the 
corporations must organize themselves well enough so they can abide the law.176 The 
corporations are liable under the respondeat superior theory for strict liability offenses and for 
crimes for which the law expressly or impliedly provides for indirect liability.177  
         For the crimes which require mens rea, corporations are liable under the identification 
theory. The natural persons who can make the corporation criminally liable are those who can 
identify themselves with the corporation; this category includes the members of the board of 
directors, the managing directors, other persons responsible for the general management of the 
corporation, and delegates responsible with management functions who can act independently.178  
The crime must be committed within the person’s scope of employment.179 If these conditions 
are met, the corporation is criminally liable even when the corporation itself is defrauded.180  
However, due to the strict limitations of the identification theory, it has been almost impossible 
to have convictions of corporations for mens rea crimes. As a result, the English law has started 
to slowly change; the courts decided that a corporation can be convicted for negligently omitting 
to take some preventive measures even though no person within the company had this specific 
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duty.181 At the same time, however, the English jurisprudence has refused to adopt the aggregate 
or collective intent theory based on precedent cases that imposed the necessity to identify the 
person who had the required mens rea and actus reus.182 This refusal has been strongly 
criticized.183  
         The United States has adopted the respondeat superior model from the civil law. “The 
principle of respondeat superior represents the implementation of the principles governing 
vicarious liability: the actus reus and the mens rea of the individuals who act on behalf of a 
corporation are automatically attributed to the corporation.”184 The corporation is liable if the 
employee commits the crime while acting within the scope of his employment and on behalf of 
the corporation.185  
         Under the federal law, a corporation may be held criminally liable for the acts of any 
employee, not only for the acts of managers or directors.186 The majority of U.S. jurisdictions 
agrees with the federal law and attributes the crimes of all the employees to the corporations.187 
In addition, the employees must have been acting within the scope of their employment. The acts 
“directly related to the performance of the type of duties the employee has general authority to 
perform”188 fall within the scope of employment. It is also sufficient that the employees act with 
apparent authority.189 It does not matter “that the act was ultra vires or unauthorized or contrary 
to corporate policy or to specific instructions given to the agent.”190  
         Unlike English law, under American law it is not necessary to identify the specific 
individuals who committed the crime; it is sufficient to prove that one or more agents of the 
corporation must have committed it. The American law went a step further and decided to 
impose liability based on the act of one employee and the culpability of another who realized the 
significance of the act.”191 This is known under the name of aggregation theory.192 This theory 
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also provides that, while no single employee had sufficient information necessary to have the 
required mens rea of the offense, if multiple individuals within the corporation possessed the 
elements of such knowledge collectively, their aggregate knowledge can be attributed to the 
corporation.193 As a result, in some situations corporations will be liable when no employee is.194  
         The employee must act on behalf of the corporation. This means that the employee must 
act with intent to benefit the corporation, but the corporation does not have to actually derive a 
benefit from the employee’s act.195 If the employee intended to benefit only himself or a third 
party, the corporation is not liable except for strict liability offenses.196 If the employee intended 
to benefit both himself and the corporation, the corporation is held criminally liable.197  
         The Model Penal Code, adopted only by a few American jurisdictions, has proposed a 
different model which contains three systems of corporate criminal liability. The first system is 
similar to the English alter ego criminal corporate liability. Corporations are liable for the 
ordinary or true crimes, such as theft or manslaughter, committed by managers or other high 
corporate officers whose acts represent the acts of the corporation.198 This is a direct criminal 
liability of corporations. Under the second system, corporations are liable for price-fixing, 
securities fraud, or other crimes for which there is an apparent legislative intent to impose 
liability on corporations, “committed by any employee acting within the scope of his 
employment on the corporation’s behalf.”199 However, corporations can defend themselves by 
showing that their managers used due diligence when attempting to prevent the crime.200 Finally, 
under the third system, corporations are generally liable for “violations” or regulatory offenses 
for which the law imposes strict liability. The offenses can be committed by any employee 
within the scope of his employment. The “due diligence” defense is not available.201 
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         Generally, there are two models of corporate criminal liability: a restrictive direct liability 
model, followed by France and England, and a wide vicarious liability model, followed by the 
United States.  The wider model seems to be more effective in combating corporate crime. The 
French and English models are not in line with the real developments of corporate structure. The 
reluctance of these models to adopt the aggregate responsibility model is likely to hamper the 
accomplishment of justice and accountability for significant types of corporate misconduct. 202 
The fragmentation and specialization of corporate departments can create an ideal way of 
escaping liability under the restrictive models: one’s apparently innocent action coupled with 
another’s will often times form a crime. The requirement that the crimes be committed by high 
ranking officers or managers is also a great impediment in combating corporate crime because 
corporations will avoid liability by empowering lower level employees to make decisions. The 
English system presents another disadvantage when requiring the identification of the individual 
who committed the act. The identification of the individual who committed the crime is often 
times impossible. Although they have the advantages of being clear, predictable, and consistent 
with the general principles of criminal law, these systems do not meet the requirements of 
general fairness and efficiency. Moreover, due to the difficulty of prosecuting corporations, the 
English and French systems are less deterring.  
         On the other hand, the American model establishes a wide system of corporate criminal 
liability that promotes general fairness and deterrence. The adoption of the aggregation theory 
and the fact that any employee can engage the criminal liability of corporations under certain 
circumstances represent great advantages; the American model comprehensively covers the wide 
variety of loopholes existent under other systems. This system is clear, predictable and efficient 
in preventing corporate crimes. At the same time, the wide possibility of convicting corporations 
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for acts of any employee increases the number of lawsuits against corporations; this causes high 
costs for the courts and the corporations, and the loss of jobs and profits for innocent employees 
and shareholders.   
         Some countries did not adopt the concept of criminal liability, and others adopted a 
restrictive model. Germany sticks to the old concept of societas deliquere non potest for 
doctrinal reasons and because it believes that criminal sanctions are not necessary. Due to the 
insufficiencies of the civil and administrative liability, France distanced itself from the German 
model. France preferred a more restrictive model because of the strong doctrinal issues that 
prevented it from initially adopting the concept of criminal liability; also, the legislators might 
have considered it more appropriate to make little steps and ease the transition towards a more 
comprehensive model. Other political issues (such as the strong influence of corporations) may 
have prevented the adoption of a wider liability model. These differences can increase the 
number of corporate crimes. A country that does not have a comprehensive corporate sanctioning 
system will attract corporations whose actions will not be accepted somewhere else.203  This 
might create an initial economical benefit for that country, but on an international, and ultimately 
national scale, such a result would be undesirable.  
          
d. Sanctions 
 
         The issue of what sanctions are appropriate for corporate criminal activities has been the 
constant subject of the doctrinal debates, and often times, has been the argument for rejecting 
corporate criminal liability. The first issue raised in this debate was the individual character of 
criminal responsibility. The critics argue that by sanctioning the corporate entity, all its members 
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are sanctioned regardless of whether they had any participation in the criminal offense. Thus, 
sanctioning a corporation to pay a criminal fine would have the indirect effect of diminishing the 
income of the stockholders, or the corporation would be forced to reduce the number of innocent 
employees who would lose their income.204 This would amount, in the critics’ view, to a criminal 
liability for another’s crimes, which would be unacceptable.205 However, the majority of the 
doctrine sustains that corporate criminal liability does not conflict with the individual character 
of criminal responsibility. The only person suffering the direct effects of a criminal sanction is 
the corporation. Corporate property is separate from the property of its members who assumed 
the risk of losing their contribution to the corporate patrimony after incorporation. Members 
form corporations in order to avoid personal liability. Even though protected by the corporations’ 
veils, members, through their corporations, cannot avoid any legal penalties that would result 
from their actions as members. Members are not usually personally liable for the corporation’s 
activity, any liability being covered by the corporation’s patrimony. The side effects of losing 
profits are risks that members have taken from the beginning. As members may benefit from the 
advantages resulting from the corporations’ activities, they also may suffer some 
inconveniences.206 Moreover, the indirect effects of corporate criminal liability suffered by the 
corporation’s members are similar to the indirect effects that family members of an individual 
criminal offender suffer. Thus, family members of a convicted criminal offender would lose the 
criminal’s material contribution and would suffer additional societal stigma. Similarly, members 
of a corporation may lose their profits, but, unlike family members of a criminal offender, they 
would not significantly suffer the infamous effect of the criminal conviction of a corporation if 
they are not also individually charged for the criminal offense.  
 38
         It has also been argued that corporate criminal liability would result in double sanctioning 
when both the individuals and the corporation are convicted for the same criminal offense. Thus, 
the convicted individuals who acted on behalf of the corporation would be sanctioned through 
the individual penalty and also by losing income from the corporation.207 However, as shown 
above, there is no risk of violating the non bis in idem principle because the corporation and the 
individuals have separate patrimonies and identities. When a representative of the corporation 
commits a criminal offense we can distinguish two separate liabilities—individual liability and 
corporate liability—which are based on separate elements.208 Therefore, corporate criminal 
liability is not incompatible with the individual character of criminal liability.  
         Part of the doctrine argued that the notion of corporation is incompatible with the notion of 
punishment.209 Critics consider that the concepts of prevention, rehabilitation, and moral pressure 
cannot be applied to corporations. Moreover, corporations cannot be physically retained in 
prisons (one of the most effective sanctions known) or executed.210 The solutions proposed by 
different countries vary widely from sanctions that merely affect the patrimony of corporations 
to those that affect all the corporations’ attributes. Although corporations cannot always be 
sanctioned identically to human beings, the concept of punishment includes a variety of 
sanctions that can alternatively be applied, and new types can be created, as necessary, both in 
the case of humans and corporations. The criminal fine penalty has been successfully applied to 
corporations in the majority of countries and has had a deterrent effect when its quantum was 
properly individualized.211 The negative publicity associated with the criminal conviction causes 
reputational harm that most of the corporations try to prevent. Criminal convictions would 
determine the adoption of new corporate policies and practices designated to prevent future 
illegalities. Moreover, the concept of rehabilitation has also been applied to corporations through 
 39
the penalties of reorganization or probation.212 The death penalty has been replaced with the 
penalty of corporate dissolution. At the same time, the criminal punishment of corporations has 
been proven to be just when it was proportional to the culpability of the corporation.213 Thus, the 
experience of the countries that have adopted corporate criminal liability has shown that criminal 
sanctions are appropriate means of fulfilling the retributive, rehabilitative and deterrent goals of 
the criminal law.  
         The criminal fines are the most common sanction. A pecuniary sanction has the advantages 
of directly affecting the corporation, it generates the capital necessary for compensation or 
restitution to the victims, it can be executed with minimum costs, and when appropriately 
individualized, it has a sufficiently strong impact to accomplish the scope of the punishment 
(especially the retributive and deterrent scopes).214 “Whereas the greatest threat to an individual 
may be the loss of liberty, the greatest threat to a company is the loss of profitability. Because 
such a loss strikes at the essential purpose of the company, a fine holds the potential to be an 
effective deterrent.”215 A corporation will balance the monetary gain from the offense with the 
loss from the potential criminal fine. Therefore, the fines must be sufficiently high to have an 
impact on the corporations.216 The amount of the fines should also take into account the financial 
resources of the corporation.217  
         At the same time, fines have some disadvantages. A very high fine would have a negative 
effect on innocent third parties. Although a corporate manager usually commits the crime, he 
will be the last one to suffer the impacts of his actions.218 However, the stockholders, other 
employees, and creditors will be affected by the secondary consequences of the penalty. Other 
effects can be the increase of the price for the corporation’s products and even the dissolution of 
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the corporation.219 Despite all its drawbacks, the fine is the least expensive and most frequently 
applied sanction.  
         Another sanction often used is confiscation of the fruits of the crime.220 Deprivation of the 
proceeds of the crime is imposed by different systems as a punishment or as a security 
measure.221 However, in order to achieve the scope of the criminal punishment, the best solution 
would be if confiscation were a complementary sanction. If confiscation were the only 
punishment imposed, the corporations would be encouraged to take the chance, since the 
probability of getting caught is not 100%.222  
         As a penalty, the activity of the corporation can be suspended for a limited period of time. 
This sanction has an important drawback because of the ricochet effect on the employees who 
would lose wages. However, this sanction seems to be justified for serious violations of labor or 
environmental laws.223 Moreover, as a solution that would attenuate the ricochet effects, some 
authors suggested that employees should be paid their salaries for the time of suspension.224  
         Dissolution represents the capital punishment for corporations. Due to its drastic effects, 
some authors argued that the sanction of dissolution should be applied only when the corporation 
committed very serious crimes, or when the corporation was created for illegal purposes.225 
Others argue that such punishment should be completely eliminated for the category of corporate 
sanctions.226 
         The publication of the decision or the adverse publicity orders (which consist in the 
publication at the company’s expense of an advertisement emphasizing the crime committed and 
its consequences) are also sanctions for corporate criminal activity.227 Both sanctions can have an 
important deterrent effect because of the incidental loss of profits that negative publicity can 
cause.228 By its nature, this sanction can be only an auxiliary sanction accompanying another 
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corporate penalty.229  This sanction also has a possible spill-over effect; the losses can cause the 
corporations to close plants or even go out of business, which in turn will negatively affect 
innocent employees, distributors, and suppliers.230  
         Other sanctions consist in restraining the corporation from the performance of some 
activities, denial, suspension or retraction of licenses, loss of rights (such as benefiting from 
subventions or tax breaks), prohibition of advertising or selling on specific markets, etc.231 
Corporations can also be restructured, required to submit periodical reports, or put under the 
supervision or control of a consultant who can recommend or impose appropriate measures for 
prevention of future crimes.232 This “corporate probation” has very strong rehabilitative 
effects.233 Its side effects on innocent third parties are also minimal. 234 “The goal, which is the 
rectification of the corporate policies and practices that gave rise to the criminal offence, is so 
crucial that a remedial/rehabilitative probation condition should be virtually automatic unless the 
company could show that it had already taken adequate steps to prevent a reoccurrence of the 
offence.”235 Another attractive solution is the sanction of community service order which is not 
likely to result in job losses and it would be extremely beneficial to the community.236  
         The French Penal Code lists all the sanctions that can be applied to corporations.237  The 
most common sanction is the fine which is applicable for all types of offenses.238 In some cases, 
the fine can be replaced with the prohibition of issuing checks, or confiscation.239 The amount of 
the fine is determined based on the limits applicable to individuals;240 the maximum amount for 
corporations cannot exceed five times the maximum for individuals unless the corporation is a 
recidivist (when the amount can be ten times the maximum for individuals).241 In addition to 
fines, the French Penal Code provides for various other sanctions such as: dissolution, 
disqualification from performing specific economic or social activities, placement for no longer 
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than five years under judicial supervision, temporary or permanent closing down of plants used 
in the commission of the crime, temporary or permanent prohibition to contract with the 
government or other public institutions, temporary or permanent prohibition to issue stock or 
checks, confiscation of goods used or produced as a result of the crime, and publication of the 
judgment.242  
         The German non-criminal model accepts as sanctions the following: fines, dissolution, 
confiscation of the fruits of the crime, privation of rights or licenses, and the imposition of 
mandatory management oversight.243 The publication of the judgment has been rejected because 
it would be too hostile to the corporations.244 The maximum fine varies according to whether the 
offense was a criminal offense or an administrative one. For criminal offenses, the corporation 
can be fined up to DM 1 million.245 For administrative offenses the maximum must be more than 
the ill-gotten gains.246 Mandatory oversight can be imposed only when the other measures have 
been unsuccessful in preventing the commission of criminal acts and it cannot be imposed for 
more than five years.247  
         In England, the standard sanction is the fine. However, because the fines are often too low 
in relation to the corporation’s financial means and the damages caused by the offense, corporate 
probation, confiscation of the proceeds of the crime, and withdrawal of licenses have also been 
scarcely accepted.248 Some authors argue that English law should reassess both the nature of the 
sanctions applicable to corporate offenders and the principles of attribution of criminal liability 
to corporations.249  
         Unlike the English sanctioning system, that, in some authors’ opinions, lacks imagination 
and effectiveness,250 the United States Sentencing Guidelines impose an innovative sanctioning 
system. The main goals of the American system are to “provide just punishment, adequate 
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deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain internal mechanism for preventing, 
detecting, and reporting criminal conduct.”251 Under federal law, the main sanctions are the 
fines, restitution, remedial orders, community service, and probation. Under some state laws, 
corporations can be sanctioned with dissolution, and ordered to refrain from engaging in certain 
kinds of business activities.252  
         The U.S. system insists on retribution and deterrence; the punishment must be just and fit. 
Therefore, the courts must calculate the amount of the fines by following several steps:  
In the first, the court will calculate a base fine that reflects the seriousness of the offence 
committed (USSG s8C2.4.). Seriousness is measured by the greater of the pecuniary gain to 
the offender; the pecuniary loss to the victim (to the extent the loss was caused intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly); and the intrinsic wrongfulness of the offence as established by a 
statutory table (USSG s8C2.4(a)). Next, the court will multiply the base fine by a numerical 
factor that reflects the culpability of the offender (USSG s8C2.7). This will yield a 
recommended fine range. Finally, the court will select an appropriate fine from within the 
recommended range, unless it can justify a departure from that range (USSG s8C2.8).253  
Moreover, in case a corporation operated primarily for a criminal purpose or by criminal means, 
fines will be set at an amount “sufficient to divest the organization of all its net assets.”254  
         In addition to paying high fines, corporations must also adopt complex internal 
mechanisms to prevent and detect crime. “This new approach to deterrence is called the carrot-
stick model. The stick consists of the application of fines, which are much higher than in the 
past. The carrot consists of a reduction in fines if the corporation has adopted an effective 
compliance and ethics program.”255 
         The American sanctioning system also ensures the goal of rehabilitation.256 The probation 
sanction allows an invasive and intense reconstruction. Courts imposing the sanction of 
probation may require corporations to 
submit to the court an effective compliance and ethics program;[] ... [to] make periodic 
reports to the court or probation officer ... regarding the organization's progress in 
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implementing the program ... . In order to monitor whether the organization is following 
the program ... the organization shall submit to ... a reasonable number of regular or 
unannounced examinations of its books and records[;] ... [or] interrogation of 
knowledgeable individuals within the organization.257 
  
The sanction of probation is imposed in eight categories of cases such as when the corporation 
has prior criminal history or it does not have an effective program to prevent and detect 
violations.258  
         The sanctions applicable to corporate offenders vary from country to country. As shown 
above, France has a wide variety of sanctions and U.S. has a very innovative and effective 
system which offers corporations strong incentives to prevent and detect corporate crimes, while 
the English system lacks many of the sanctions presented. The French system has the advantage 
of being clear, but the system seems to be less deterring because the calculation of fines is 
reported to the fines applicable to individuals. This disadvantage can also be viewed as an 
advantage because of its smaller spill-over effects on innocent employees or shareholders. The 
French system may also be less rehabilitative because it lacks the corporate probation sanction.                    
         The American system not only achieves the goals of deterrence, retribution, and 
rehabilitation, but it also offers incentives for self-policing and avoidance of costly trials. And 
“[i]t is in society's interest to transform corporate cultures that might previously have encouraged 
or implicitly tolerated illegality to cultures that take seriously their legal obligations.”259 The 
fines are not reported to the maximum applicable to individuals so courts can impose fines with 
deterrent effects on corporations. However, this may have some significant spill-over effects on 
innocent employees and shareholders. Moreover, the innovative sanction of corporate probation 
has the advantage of fulfilling all the scopes of the criminal punishment while having 
insignificant spill-over effects.   
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e. Alternatives to Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
         Some critics have argued that other types of liability are more efficient than corporate 
criminal liability. Law and economics theorists believe that criminal liability is too over-
deterring; it induces corporations to spend more resources for prevention than is economically 
and socially useful.260 Moreover, the costs of criminal proceedings are higher than the civil ones 
and therefore, not justified when both have the same result—pecuniary penalties.261 It has also 
been argued that the reputational harm accompanying corporate criminal liability is either 
unnecessary or excessive.262 Thus, corporations convicted for minor criminal offenses would 
suffer unjustified reputational harm. Corporations that have a good reputation suffer the most, 
while corporations not yet created or that previously lost their good reputation suffer little 
reputational harm. When a corporation is convicted for a serious crime, the reputational harm 
imposed through criminal liability might not even be necessary due to the negative publicity 
created by the press. The high risk of reputational harm would also pressure corporations to 
speed up the procedures and plead guilty when the charge is groundless. In addition, the 
reputational damage resulting from a criminal conviction, unlike civil damages, “does not 
provide a reciprocal gain to any injured party.”263 Hence, several authors argue that civil liability 
of corporations is sufficient.  
         Although the civil liability of corporations has its advantages in compensating for the 
injuries caused by corporations, it is not sufficient to prevent corporate criminal misconduct. 
Some offenses, called crimes “of danger,” do not create victims who can sue the corporations for 
civil damages. Or in environmental crimes, victims might not even know about the commission 
of the crime by the corporations. Moreover, in some crimes connected with the process of 
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production and distribution of goods, the victim is so far in the chain that he/she does not even 
realize that the corporation was the author of the offense.264 On the other hand, although the 
benefit to the corporation is substantial due to a high number of victims, the prejudice caused is 
so small that the initiation of a civil lawsuit is unjustified.265  Even when a corporation is civilly 
obligated to pay damages, civil sanctions may not be sufficient to determine the corporation to 
refrain from future misconduct when the benefits obtained from the misconduct outweigh the 
civil damages paid. The reputational harm resulting from corporate criminal liability might 
encourage faster settlements, thus avoiding pricey trials.266 Furthermore, criminal liability 
expresses the society’s condemnation of the corporate misconduct,267 “thereby vindicating the 
proper valuation of persons and goods whose true worth was disparaged by the corporation's 
conduct - just as in the case of an individual wrongdoer.”268 Corporations have an identifiable 
persona and can express moral judgments distinct from those of their members. Therefore, 
corporations can be the subject of the expressive retributive goal of criminal law.   
         Another advantage is the possibility of using “the extensive network of federal and state 
prosecutors and investigators…”269 which has additional resources compared to the civil or 
administrative law enforcement departments. Defendants should afford the criminal procedure 
guarantees and speedy trials. The types of the criminal sanctions are also more diverse; in 
addition to fines, sanctions of corporate probation, equity fines, or withdrawal of licenses can be 
applied.  
         Civil liability of corporations for criminal fines imposed on corporate officers is another 
alternative to corporate criminal liability. This solution has been used in Italy,270 Portugal,271 
Netherlands,272 Belgium,273 Luxemburg,274 and France.275 This alternative has been widely 
criticized. First, civil liability of corporations for criminal liability oftentimes serves only as a 
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surety.276 Second, this system contravenes the principle of individual punishment; the corporate 
officer is said to be guilty, but the corporation has to bear the sanction.277 The corporation is not 
the defendant in the criminal procedure and it does not have the opportunity to prove its case, but 
the burden of the sanction is placed on it. Third, this alternative would create inequality of 
treatment of the individuals convicted for the offenses; if the law provides as sanctions for the 
offense both imprisonment and a fine, the individual condemned to pay a fine will not execute it, 
but the individual sanctioned by imprisonment must execute the punishment.278 Fourth, the 
identification of the person who committed the offense is necessary. Corporations have a very 
complex structure and sometimes it is very difficult or impossible to determine who the author of 
an offense was.279 Finally, in a system that did not adopt the criminal liability of corporations, 
the limits of a fine are established taking into account the potential to pay of the individual. 
Therefore, even if the corporation has to pay the fine, the amount would be derisory.280 Hence, 
the civil liability of corporations for criminal fines imposed on its employees cannot fulfill the 
purposes of deterrence and retribution.  
         A very frequently used alternative to corporate criminal liability has been the imposition of 
administrative sanctions. They are usually imposed by administrative bodies which are part of 
the executive branch, the courts playing a limited role in some countries when so allowed.281 
Some of the reasons why different countries chose to impose administrative sanctions by 
administrative bodies, as opposed to criminal sanctions imposed by courts, are: the belief that 
moral stigma is superfluous, the flexibility of the concepts of guilt and individual responsibility 
in  the administrative law, and the specialized nature of the administrative bodies that could 
handle the matters more efficiently.282 Germany, which still opposes the adoption of corporate 
criminal liability, has an elaborate system of administrative-penal sanctioning consecrated in art. 
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30 of OwiG. Because some administrative sanctions can be imposed by criminal courts and 
because they derive from petty-offenses, the non-criminal character of these administrative 
sanctions has been questioned.283  France and Belgium have devised administrative sanctions 
whenever it seemed suitable in the course of drafting statutes.284  Portugal285 and Italy286 have 
also implemented an extensive system of administrative sanctions. Many critics argue that the 
strong impact of these sanctions make them resemble criminal sanctions287  which lack the 
constitutional guarantees of criminal procedure.288 Moreover, corporate administrative liability 
raises the same issues as corporate criminal liability does regarding the mens rea element and the 
individual character of criminal liability.289 Some authors argue that it is unfair that the 
individuals may be held criminally liable while the corporations are merely administratively 
sanctioned for the same offense. It is also strongly criticized the fact that corporations are 
administratively penalized for minor offense, but escape liability for very serious offenses like 
manslaughter.290 Moreover, the administrative sanctions do not symbolize the moral 
condemnation of the society. Thus, the doctrine has advanced a possible resolution: corporations 
should be held administratively liable for minor offenses, but should be held criminally liable for 
more serious offenses.291 
         Some authors have also argued that individual criminal liability is less complicated and 
may be sufficient. This argument has been strongly criticized for several reasons. First, due to the 
high complexity of modern corporations, the individuals responsible for the offense might be 
impossible to identify. Such is the case when the decision process is fragmented among multiple 
departments, when the activity of some employees is not systematically verified because of his 
or her position of trust, or when a decision is taken by a multimember board by secret vote.292 
Second, prosecutors may conclude that indicting an individual is not justified because the 
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employee thought that his or her superiors were aware of and approved the action or because 
they acted from fear of losing their jobs.293 Third, some of the persons who made the illegal 
decision might be located in another country and could not be prosecuted.294 Fourth, individual 
criminal liability is most of the times ineffective because the amount of a fine is tailored to 
reflect the individual’s financial possibilities, and some systems allow the reimbursement of 
fines paid by the corporate employee, or corporations can insure themselves against intentional 
and unintentional wrongdoing (for environmental offenses usually).295 Lastly, some systems 
require the designation of a person responsible for the corporation’s activities or high managers 
are automatically presumed responsible without strong requirements of showing of guilt or 
proximate cause;296 the agent is compensated for this high risk and is reimbursed for the criminal 
fines. This solution encourages corporate wrongdoing because it would be probably less 
expensive for a corporation to hire a new manager “responsible with going to prison” than giving 
up the illicit activity.297  
         All of the above arguments underline the extreme importance of criminal corporate liability 
in a modern society. The new technology and development of industry give raise to 
unpredictable risks that pose serious threats to our society. Corporations try to obtain the highest 
profits in the shortest time, and some of them are ready to achieve this result by any means. 
Some corporations are especially incorporated with the secret purpose of committing criminal 
offenses. Most countries that adopted criminal liability of corporations concluded that corporate 
misconduct should not be left unsanctioned in the most efficient way. Criminal sanctions’ 
retributive nature better expresses the society’s moral condemnation and emphasizes the value of 
any victim. The experience of United States, France, and England in implementing criminal 
sanctions on corporations shows that corporate criminal liability can successfully improve and 
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coexist together with the criminal liability of individuals, administrative liability, and civil 
liability of corporations and individuals. Corporate criminal liability better promotes general 
fairness and is consistent with the principles of criminal law.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
         Several countries were, and some still are refusing to accept the concept of corporate 
criminal liability due to doctrinal, political, and historical reasons. Out of those formerly 
refusing to accept this concept, some started to slowly change their views. Why now? What 
has changed? The realities of our times have been changing so much that legislatures have 
realized that doctrinal issues are less important than the prevention and appropriate 
punishment of large-scale white-collar crimes, money-laundering, illegal arms sales, 
environmental harm, product liability, and many others. Some of the countries that have 
newly introduced the corporate criminal liability in their legal systems provide for restrictive 
systems of engaging liability and punishing criminal activities of corporations. That might be 
because they are apprehensive of rapid and extreme changes in a short period of time. Or 
maybe the realities of their societies are not sufficiently pressuring; the historical, social, 
economic, and political realties differ from country to country, and these differences have a 
strong influence on the legal systems. Also, the influence of the interests of powerful 
corporations should not be ignored. Hopefully, all the legal systems will achieve uniformity 
regarding this issue.  
         Although the system developed in United States is presently considered the most 
advanced in the world, the American model has a few drawbacks that could probably be 
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eliminated by using elements from other models or by creating new solutions. The American 
system’s most important disadvantages are the significant spill-over effects on innocent 
employees and shareholders, the possible over-deterring effect, and the high costs of 
implementing corporate criminal liability. However, its advantages outweigh its 
disadvantages. The American model seems to better reflect the actual developments of 
corporate structure and, thus, it is better suited to punish corporate crime. The retributive and 
rehabilitative effects of criminal punishment are almost perfectly reflected by the American 
model.  Moreover, this system is clear, predictable, consistent with the principles of criminal 
law, and fair.  
         The French and English systems are also clear, predictable and consistent with the 
general principles of criminal law. Moreover, they do not have significant side effects on 
innocent individuals and are not over-deterring. However, these systems seem to be less 
deterring and, sometimes, unfair (in the English system for example, when the corporation is 
liable even when the manager defrauded the corporation itself). The prosecution of 
corporations is very difficult due to the significant restrictions of these models. Thus, the 
retributive goal of the criminal law cannot be effectively achieved. In addition, these systems, 
together with the German one, would probably have the effect of attracting potential 
corporate criminals seeking to avoid liability.  
         Corporations are independent juristic persons that can cause harm. Therefore, 
corporations should bear the responsibility of their actions. Although corporations have been 
initially conceived as a method of avoiding personal liability, and although its members will 
feel the side effects of sanctioning corporations, members do not lose more than what they 
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were willing to risk from the beginning (at incorporation). Moreover, they can prevent 
corporate crime by adopting special preventive measures, as the American model suggests.  
         The corporate criminal liability models developed so far show that the only way to 
effectively punish and battle corporate crime is to criminally punish corporations. 
Prosecution of individuals only is unjust not only to them, but to society at large because 
convictions of individuals will rarely affect the way corporations will conduct their business 
in the future. Moreover, civil and administrative liability of corporations is not sufficient. 
Victims do not always have the financial resources to pursue a civil claim. Although the 
administrative liability system promoted by Germany has some efficiency, similarly to civil 
liability systems, it lacks the procedural guarantees and the stigma characteristic to criminal 
law. Criminal law is the only one that reaffirms all the values trampled on by corporate 
criminals. Criminal law punishes justly; its irreplaceable retributive, deterrent, and 
rehabilitative characteristics satisfy the public demand for vengeance. Criminal punishment 
of corporations sends a symbolic message: no crime goes unpunished. And a just punishment 
includes the moral condemnation of society.   
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